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The Authority of Law and the Production of Truth in India
Daniela Berti
 Authors who have analyzed the linguistic mechanisms by  which power is exercised in a 
formal setting have focused on courtroom interactions and on the strategic use of language in a 
legal context. Courtroom studies have been undertaken since the 1980s and 1990s by authors 
working on ethnomethodology or conversation analysis (Atkinson and Drew 1979; Matoesian 
1993; Conley and O’Barr 1998; Drew and Heritage 1992). By drawing mostly on Foucault’s 
notion of “micro-power” (1977:26-27), these authors have studied how lawyers and judges 
regulate the turn-taking process, the role of silence, the forms of questioning or of interrupting, 
and the imbalance of power that emerges from courtroom dialogues. The aim of these works has 
been to study how power is concretely enacted in a day-to-day situation by  examining the face-
to-face interactions that constitute courtroom proceedings and the microdetails of discursive 
practices. Here, power is seen as emanating from courtroom-defined speaking roles, from 
linguistic mechanisms of talk in the courtroom, and from professional speech styles. It is the 
power to control a setting where rules and turns of speech are very different from those in 
everyday conversation, where some are authorized to speak and others are restricted to giving 
answers, and where, by  using a legal technique of interrogation, professionals transform a 
dialogue into a self-serving monologue (Conley and O’Barr 1990:21).
 Some of these works focus on the “rigidity” of court interactions and on the asymmetrical 
distribution of communicative resources (Conley and O’Barr 1990:21). Others have shown the 
more creative, improvisational nature of these features of speech, the “relative narrative and 
conversational freedom” of the lawyer and the witnesses that enables them to produce various 
strategies to utilize these interactions for their own pragmatic purposes (Gnisci and Pontecorvo 
2004:967). In a case-study involving an Italian political leader, Gnisci and Pontecorvo show, for 
example, that although the formal asymmetry of roles during the hearing might make the legal 
professional appear as the “powerful director of the conversation” (2004:982), observations of 
trial interactions reveal that the witness disposes of various devices to make their point: they can 
change the topic, broach other topics, comment on evidence, modify the duration of turn, or 
interrupt. Within this study  they show how a form of arena for verbal combat is created with the 
witnesses orienting their strategies to give an “elaborate answer” that  not only  aims at  satisfying 
the requirements of the question, but also at imposing their own line of argument. The authors 
also note that although one option available to the witness is to simply provide no information at 
all, by saying that he or she does not remember or by evading the question, there are few replies 
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of this kind compared to elaborate answers due to the negative effect they may  have on the 
witness’s credibility (Gnisci and Pontecorvo 2004).
 This article draws on this idea of shared control over trial interactions between witnesses 
and legal professionals to analyze a criminal case observed at Shimla District Court in Northern 
India. In this case, the complainant along with other prosecutor witnesses turned hostile during 
the trial and denied all previous accusations. Unlike the high-profile Italian case mentioned 
above where witnesses were linguistically  equipped to engage in a “war of words” (Gnisci and 
Pontecorvo 2004:981) with the legal specialist, the case analyzed here is in a setting where the 
linguistic authority of the legal professionals, who speak English and who have mastered judicial 
procedures, starkly  contrasts with the poor content of the replies given by the witnesses, who do 
not understand English and are completely unfamiliar with juridical notions. By focusing on the 
mechanism of narrative production and on how oral and written statements are produced in 
court, I will show how the witness’s replies, even though they consist in simply nodding or 
saying “I don’t know” or “It is not true,” succeed in demolishing the prosecutor’s case and in 
preventing the judge from convicting the accused. More generally, the case analyzed here 
demonstrates how the power of language in a trial situation does not necessarily  rely  on rhetoric 
and persuasion, but on specific procedural rules that determine the evidentiary value of what the 
witness says even when their credibility is challenged in court.
 The question of the effect that procedure may have in the acquisition of truth has been 
addressed both in the field of courtroom ethnography (Scheffer 2010; Latour 2004) and more 
generally  by authors who have focused on the study  of talk and interaction in institutional 
contexts (Atkinson 1979, 1982; Atkinson and Heritage 1984; Drew and Heritage 1992; Dupret 
2006; Ho 2008). Conversation analysis in particular has attempted to uncover the “often tacit 
reasoning procedures and linguistic competencies underlying the production and interpretation of 
talk in organized sequences of interaction” (Hutchby and Wooffitt 2008:12). The primacy of 
procedure has also been argued in the field of legal history. Langbein, for instance, has shown 
how the increasing technicality  of procedure in English Crown Courts had the effect of silencing 
the accused, leaving case-making to the control of the lawyer (Langbein 2003). Although this 
may be equally true regarding the Indian courts inherited from the British, the case presented 
here shows how witnesses, in spite of their ignorance of legal procedure and even of the 
language of the court, may end up  disrupting the rules of evidence followed in criminal 
proceedings from the inside.
Filing a Complaint
 In September 2007 a young married woman from a rural area, the mother of a two-year-
old daughter, was taken to Shimla hospital by  some of her in-laws. Anjana, as she was called, 
suffered burns to 90 per cent of her body and died in hospital a few days later. She had allegedly 
committed suicide in her marital house by pouring kerosene over her body and by setting herself 
alight. According to the version given by her in-laws, as soon as they  heard her cries, they broke 
down the door, which was closed from inside, placed blankets over her body, and rushed her to 
hospital. When the investigations had gotten underway, a diary  was found in the woman’s 
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bedroom. Some pages had apparently  been written by Anjana about her decision to kill herself.1 
One passage read as follows (suicide note, in court file):
My marriage is a lie. A relationship based on lies will always remain a sham. I could have never 
imagined that I would end up marrying a person who is a drunkard and a bad man. Neither his 
presence nor his absence from the house makes a difference . . . .
In another passage, Anjana wrote about  the lack of affection from her in-laws, and recounted in 
detail the clashes she had had with her mother-in-law. At the end of this section she addressed a 
man named Sunny, whom she called “brother” and who, according to her, was in the police 
(suicide note, in court file):
Sunny, if you consider me your sister, then leave my daughter with my parents or with the 
Orphanage House. I see no point in living, and I pray to God that he will send me back and I will 
take my revenge. You are in the Police, so I hope you will render justice.
After Anjana’s death, an FIR (First Information Record) was registered by the police on behalf of 
her father, which accused the husband and mother-in-law of maltreating his daughter and of 
harassing her with incessant dowry  requests. The case was then considered by the police as a 
“dowry case” and framed under section 498a, “subjecting a married woman to cruelty,” 
punishable by three years’ imprisonment and under section 306, “abetting the commission of 
suicide,” which carries a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.2 The victim’s husband and mother-
in-law were brought before a magistrate and placed in police custody, although they were later 
released on bail.
 Here are some passages from the FIR that were written by the police in Hindi on behalf 
of Anjana’s father (First Information Report in court file, my translation):
I organized my daughter’s marriage according to Hindu custom . .  . . After the marriage, Anjana 
led a normal married life. For the last six months Anjana’s husband and mother-in-law started 
harassing her for the dowry (deja ke liye tang kiya).  They used to taunt her saying that her father 
didn’t even include bedding in her dowry.
In the report, the father also referred to some arguments that took place between Anjana and her 
mother-in-law. The complaint ends with the sentence (First Information Report):
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1 Suicide notes are frequently found in such cases, though their authenticity is often challenged in court 
either by the prosecutor or by the defense lawyer, depending on what is written in the diary. In the present case, the 
note had been legally authenticated as belonging to Anjana.
2 Srinivas (1984) calls the “new dowry” the money or property the husband or his family demands from the 
bride’s family after the wedding. These demands, which may be protracted even years after the wedding, may end in 
the girl’s murder (presented as an accident) or her suicide.
I believe that Anjana’s husband and mother-in-law harassed her to such an extent that she was 
helpless and thus she poured kerosene over herself, set light to herself and tried to end her life. 
Legal action is to be taken.
The story reported in the FIR is a reframed version of an interaction between the complainant 
and the police officer.3 Formulations used in the report, for instance that the in-laws used “to 
harass” the woman saying that  her father “didn’t even include bedding in her dowry,” are very 
common in these cases and appear to correspond to a conventional style of writing aimed at 
producing an “authoritative document” (Komter 2006) on which the investigative process is 
based.
 It is worth noting that in India, as in other adversarial systems, or common law systems 
where the opposing sides must both collect and submit  evidence as well as cross-examine 
witnesses, police officers are independent of legal officers, and investigations are led under their 
own authority.4 Although some high-ranking police officers have their offices within the court 
complex and sometimes, as in Shimla, even next door to the prosecutor’s office, the prosecutor is 
not supposed to become involved in the investigation until the challan (charge sheet) is presented 
to the court.
 During the investigations, the relationship  between the police officers and those 
questioned (the accused and witnesses) is one of power because the police represent and are 
empowered by the state authority.5 According to section 161 of The Code of Criminal Procedure 
(2006 [1973]:84), for example, a police officer may “examine orally  any person supposed to be 
acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case . . . [He] may reduce into writing any 
statement made to him in the course of an examination.”
 The people I spoke to during my fieldwork often referred to the police’s habit of readily 
reverting to physical violence or other forms of abuse. They also presented police officers as 
open to negotiate with one party  or the other involved in a case and to formulate the case in a 
particular way in exchange for some form of compensation. The police officers’ authoritative 
position during the investigation is very often overturned at the time of the trial, during which the 
prosecutor’s witness, even the one who filed the complaint, starts contradicting or completely 
denying what is written (on their behalf) in the police report. By  referring to some sequences of 
the trial which involved Anjana’s husband and mother-in-law, I analyze an example of how the 
police report was deconstructed by the witness during the trial and the way this situation was 
managed by the Court.
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3 Although I do not know what was actually said between the police and the complainant in the case here 
(since it took place two years before), I have based my observations on other cases that I was able to follow at 
Shimla police station during my stay.
4 Since 1973, the police in India have been a separate agency from the prosecutor.
5 This is very different from what happens in inquisitorial systems where, at every stage in the criminal law 
process, legal professionals monitor all the police officers’ decisions regarding the case (Komter 2002).
Hostility on Record
 The trial took place in 2009, almost two years after Anjana’s death. Anjana’s father, an 
illiterate man, was summoned by the prosecutor to repeat before the court what he had 
supposedly said to the police. He had travelled in from the countryside and was waiting outside 
the courtroom along with some members of the in-laws’ family  who were also scheduled to give 
their testimony the same day. Before being heard by the Court he had been called to the 
prosecutor’s office to be reminded about what he had said to the police during investigations. I 
did not  attend this meeting, but when the trial began, the prosecutor looked rather worried. In the 
courtroom, lawyers were attending the hearing. The two accused stood at the end of the 
courtroom near the entrance.
 The judge addressed the witness in Hindi and asked him to repeat an oath: “What I will 
say I will say the truth, on behalf of dharma.” He then asked him some preliminary questions 
and, after each reply, he dictated in English to the typist the content of the question-reply 
interaction by reformulating it in the form of the witness’s first-person narration. The first lines 
of this transcription go as follows (court file):
Stated that Anjana was my daughter. She was married with accused Susheel.  Her marriage took 
place 5 years back. She gave birth to a female child who is now 4 years old. After the 
solemnization of her marriage Anjana resided to her matrimonial house peacefully.
The use of English creates a barrier between the judge or other legal professionals and the 
witness, who does not even understand the language into which the judge translates the witness's 
replies before dictating them.6  The judge plays an active part in the interactions, questioning 
witnesses at  length, especially when he estimates that the prosecutor is not doing his job 
properly. This is in keeping with a specific Supreme Court directive whereby a District Judge 
must not  be a “silent spectator” during the hearing in Shyam Narayan Singh and Ors. vs. State of 
Bihar (Abidi 1993:16). It also reflects the judge’s need to dispose of all the information he 
requires to write his decision. In fact, although a Session Judge is the highest authority at  District 
level, his work is supervised by  High Court and Supreme Court judges, who can completely 
overturn his judgment and censure him if he makes any mistakes.
 At the very beginning of the trial, when Anjana’s father started by saying that his daughter 
lived happily  with her husband in her marital house, the judge seemed puzzled. “Did your 
daughter ever complain to you?” The judge asked him. “No, Sir,” the father replied. The judge, 
in a solemn tone of voice and looking at him sternly, dictated to the typist in English, “My 
daughter never complained to me or to my family  members of any cruelty to her at  the hands of 
the accused.” Then, again shifting to Hindi “What did you say in the statement to the police? 
What did you dictate?” “I didn’t say anything,” replied the father, “I said to the police whatever 
they  [the in-laws] told me; they told me that there was just some disagreement between them, I 
only said that, and nothing else.”
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6 It should be noted that there is no popular jury in Indian Courts, which renders discussions much more 
technical and juridically oriented than in a trial with a jury.
 The judge, visibly annoyed, dictated in English: “The accused did not maltreat my 
daughter at any time after the marriage nor did I state the same facts to the police.” He then 
dictated in English to the typist a conventional formula to indicate that the witness had turned 
hostile (court file):
At this stage the learned Public Prosecutor put forth a request that he be allowed to cross-examine 
the witness because the witness has resiled from his previous statement. Request allowed.
The formula indicates a shift in the rules for questioning the witness. Technically  speaking, it 
indicates a shift from the examination-in-chief, during which the witness is asked open 
questions, to the cross-examination where the questions presuppose the answers and to which the 
witness must reply “yes” or “no.” In fact, the passage mentioned above shows how the judge had 
already used a leading question by asking the father, “Did your daughter ever complain to you?” 
This was his immediate reaction to what the father had just said that Anjana had been living 
happily with her husband and her in-laws. The judge no doubt wanted to see how far the witness 
would go in denying all the accusations before dictating the conventional formula, indicating that 
the witness was now going to be cross-examined.
 The shift from examination-in-chief to cross-examination implies much more than merely 
a different way of formulating the questions. It points to a radical change in the relationship  the 
witness has with the prosecutor, from being someone who supports his case—and in this case 
who actually lodged the complaint—to being the main cause for the prosecutor’s defeat. The 
witness will in fact be declared “hostile,” which is a way of saying that he is lying to the Court. 
In fact, the formula mentioned above “At this stage . . .” implies that the witness is no longer to 
be trusted. To say that a witness is “hostile,” that he has retracted or contradicted his previous 
statement, is to “cast doubt on his credibility”—another expression commonly used in judicial 
jargon.
 The reason for writing this formula in the court  report  is not to inform the witness, as the 
witness does not even understand the language in which the formula is dictated. As a matter of 
fact, this kind of formula has first and foremost a written value. By going through the evidence 
records, any legal professional can immediately see the point beyond which the witness’ 
credibility is challenged. In the court report of the hearing, these passages are clearly visible 
because the typist conventionally marks them in bold print and in a separate paragraph “Cross-
examination (or ‘xx’) by Sh . . ., learned P. P. (Public Prosecutor) for the State.”
 Although the request is always formulated in the report as if made by the prosecutor, in 
this case (as in many others), it was the judge who decided to use it. After the judge dictated the 
formula, the prosecutor looked frustrated and resigned. It was clear that, as he had already 
surmised after his meeting with the witness, he regarded the case as already  lost. He said to the 
judge, “Sir, he has now reached a compromise with the accused . . .” The judge, however, was 
not ready to give up. He looked at the witness straight in the eyes and asked him directly, in a 
very disappointed tone of voice, “Did you come to a compromise with them?” The father replied 
nervously: “Yes sir, there is talk going on between us.”
 The existence of a private compromise between the parties is very frequently assumed by 
a judge in cases where the witness turns hostile, although it is rarely  revealed explicitly  during 
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the trial. Even in this case, however, where the existence of a private arrangement was admitted 
by the complainant, the trial proceedings could not be suspended. In fact, the offenses that had 
allegedly been committed by  the accused (abetment to suicide and maltreatment) are considered 
to be “not compoundable”; they cannot be compromised by the parties. The trial then proceeded 
and followed all the regular stages.
 As if ignoring what the father had just said, the judge continued with the cross-
examination. He asked him many  questions, trying to get him to confirm his previous statement. 
“Did your daughter tell you that they [the in-laws] told her that she did not bring any bedding 
from her father’s house?” “No Sir,” replied the father. The judge dictated in English (court file):
My daughter never complained that she had not brought the bedding from the house of her parents 
in dowry. [Confrontation with portion A to A of the statement . . . in which it is so recorded].
In the court report this last sentence is recorded in brackets at the end of the dictation. This is 
another conventional way  of recording the fact that the witness is not to be trusted. By recording 
the reply given by the witness in court and by comparing it to the statement he had previously 
given to the police, the transcription enabled the judge to point out the contradiction. The 
formula [confrontation with . . .] is again expressed in English and pronounced in order for it to 
be put on record rather than to be actually understood by the witness.
 The judge continued to ask in Hindi, “Did the police read the statement that you’d made? 
Were you shown the written statement?” “No Sir.” “You just  tell us whether you said this to the 
police or not?” said the judge, irritated. “No Sir,” said the father. The judge dictated to the typist 
in English: “The statement EX.PW-1 was not read over and explained to me by the police. I am 
quite illiterate and only know to put my signature.”
 This last sentence was dictated by the judge as a logical implication of what the witness 
had said; that he did not know what was written in the report that the police had written on his 
behalf and had asked him to sign. This sentence is commonly used in such a situation and 
appears to be a ready-made formula. The judge then continued to dictate in English (court file):
I had not stated in my statement that 6 months prior to her death, the accused had started 
maltreating and taunting Anjana for not bringing dowry or even bedding (confrontation with 
portion A to A of statement Ex. PW-1/A in which it is so recorded).
The judge, then, addressed the father in Hindi, “Look, her mother-in-law and her husband were 
mistreating her. This is all you told the police. Did you tell the police this in particular?’’ “No, I 
didn’t tell the police,” replied the father.
 The judge then continued dictating (court file): “Nor did my daughter complain to me that 
the accused had started treating her with cruelty  nor did I make such a statement to the police. 
[Confronted with portion B to B of statement Ex PW-1 /A in which it is so recorded].”
 At the end of the cross-examination, after the witness had denied many other points 
which were mentioned in the police report, the judge, rather annoyed, asked him: “Then why did 
you register the case with the police?” “It was a mistake,” said the father. “Now tell me,” said the 
 THE AUTHORITY OF LAW AND PRODUCTION OF TRUTH IN INDIA 351
judge, “have you reached a compromise or are you just telling a lie?” “Yes, a compromise has 
now been reached,” replied the father, “and I am telling the truth.”
 The witness had already admitted at the beginning of the hearing that a compromise had 
been reached although the judge had not put this information on record. Then, as a conclusion to 
the written report of the hearing, and without asking the witness any further questions, the judge 
dictated in English to the typist (court file):
This case has been made by me by mistake. It is not true that due to compromise now I am 
deposing in favour of the accused to save them from legal consequences.
The use of the formula “It is not true . . .” used at the beginning of the last sentence, “that I (the 
witness) am deposing in favour of the accused . . .” allows the judge to suggest on record that the 
witness has just denied that he “is telling a lie” because of the compromise he has reached with 
the accused.
 The procedures used to write up the cross-examination enable the judge to ensure that the 
major points in the police report figure in the evidence record that  is drafted by the court—
implicitly, through the witness’s denial of the questions put to him during the cross-examination 
and through the references made in brackets after each sentence. The result is a two-layered 
narrative or a “dual truth”: one is clearly disputed by the judge but is legally binding and leads to 
the acquittal of the accused; the other is a counter-narrative, tangentially evoked in the transcript 
of the verbal exchanges at the bar, and pointing to facts that the judge deems plausible but devoid 
of any  legal value—a rhetorical device (Wolff 1995) that allows judges to suggest that they have 
not been deceived (Berti and Tarabout, forthcoming). The truth thus established is then restricted 
to a procedural truth.
 The witnesses’ attitude of turning hostile in court is routine in India, with no action 
usually  being taken against them. A reason often suggested to explain the recurrence of this 
attitude is that the statement given to the police is not signed by  the witness and therefore is of no 
legal value.7 However, even in cases such as the one presented here where the witness, who is 
also the complainant, had to sign the report, no action was taken against him. In fact, when I 
questioned judges or prosecutors on the topic of hostile witnesses, the prevalent attitude was one 
of resignation.
 In order to prevent witnesses from turning hostile, a former Session Judge in Shimla tried 
to adopt a practice which became a bone of contention, especially  among defense lawyers. 
Instead of first questioning the witness during the examination, the judge dictated directly to the 
typist what was written in the police report that was in front of him. Defense lawyers in 
particular were uncomfortable about the situation and the atmosphere in court was very tense. 
When the judge was transferred to another court, the lawyers breathed a sigh of relief because 
they could once again hope to win their cases easily.
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7 According to section 162 of The Code of Criminal Procedure (2006 [1973]:84) “No statement made by 
any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing,  be 
signed by the person making it.”
The Production of a Counter Story
 The witness’s father was then cross-examined by the defense lawyer even though he now 
fully  supported the accused. The consensual interaction the witness had with the lawyer strongly 
contrasted with the one he had just had with the judge. To each question, the father replied in the 
affirmative and the lawyer (or alternatively the judge) dictated to the typist (court file):
It is correct that the accused never demanded any dowry from me till the death of my daughter 
Anjana . . . It is correct that my daughter never complained of any cruelty to her at the hands of 
accused. It is correct that the accused treated my daughter Anjana like her own daughter.
The trial interrogation and transcription techniques, particularly  during the cross-examination, 
provided the defense lawyer with an effective means of allowing the witness the possibility  of 
confirming what the lawyer wanted to put on record.
 The lawyer’s aim was also to provide a plausible reason for Anjana’s suicide. “Anjana 
was a very beautiful girl,” he told me during a conversation. “She married a man who was not 
good-looking and had not had any education.” Anjana’s “beauty complex,” or, as the lawyer put 
it, her “superiority  complex,” was evident in the note she left in her diary which, according to 
him, showed how “she was of a particular stature and intellect,” but also that “she was suffering 
from depression.”
She thought she could have made a much better match than with this person whose status was not 
likely to improve .  .  . . She was also short-tempered and got annoyed about petty matters. She used 
to leave the house without telling her mother-in-law or her husband, and used to stay away for two 
days . . . .I have come to know . . . even if this is not on record for the case . . . that the victim had 
an extramarital relationship with the police officer, Sunny, whom she called brother in her diary.
The picture the lawyer gave of Anjana’s personality—for example, the fact that she was “short-
tempered”—partly corresponds to a standardized, script-like version that is commonly  used by 
lawyers in such cases.
 During the trial, the lawyer strove to bring out this picture of Anjana’s personality  
through the questions he put to the witnesses.8 In cross-examining the father, he also referred to 
an episode described in the police report according to which Anjana would have been slapped by 
her mother-in-law. He wished to suggest  that the reason given in the report, that this slap was 
related to dowry demands, had been completely invented by the police. Here are some passages 
from the court interactions translated from Hindi (court file):
Lawyer: This Anjana was “short-tempered” (this expression is used in English)
The father nodded.
Lawyer: Your daughter told you that she was slapped. Did you ask her why she was slapped?
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8 Although I was not been present at any encounter between the lawyer and the witness, I know from the 
conversation I had with the lawyer that he had instructed the father about the way to reply at the hearing. On the 
importance of lawyers preparing the witnesses for the court interaction, see Kidder (1973).
Father: I don’t know.
Lawyer: She was your daughter, and they [the in-laws] also loved her like their daughter.
Father: Yes, sir.
Lawyer: If the youngest makes a mistake, it is the duty of the elders to scold them and to bring 
them back to the right path.
Father: Yes, sir.
Judge, puzzled by the lawyer’s question he addressed the lawyer in English: What has that to do 
with the case?
The judge did not accept this kind of defense and asked the lawyer to stop asking that kind of 
question.
Lawyer, to the judge: Nothing sir. There was a misunderstanding between the mother-in-law and 
the daughter-in-law. The point about the slap is that this was recorded by the police against the 
witness’s will and in order to make a stronger case. That’s the way it works.
The judge looked at the witness who said quietly “I don’t remember anything sir.”
Following the lawyer’s explanation, the judge then dictated in English: “I don’t know whether 
under police pressure I stated that my daughter had disclosed to me that she had been inflicted 
slaps by her mother-in-law in order to make out a case against the accused.”
 The idea that a witness’s, or even, as in this particular case, the complainant’s statement 
was written under police pressure is also frequently suggested by lawyers. It  corresponds to a 
discourse which some judges in India often hold, according to which the police do not hesitate to 
“exaggerate” the facts reported by the witness in order “to make the case stronger” (Berti 2015).
 While talking to me about the Anjana case, the lawyer told me that when a woman 
commits suicide, the police systematically  make reference to dowry  demands and dowry 
harassment “to attract” sections 306 and 498a.
The statement in the FIR is written in such a way that it meets the necessary conditions for the 
case to be investigated. They need to meet the village people’s expectations and to show them that 
they are the real protectors of the locality . . . If a person loses their life in such a terrible way and 
the police do not take any action it would give a very wrong message, especially in the village 
where the events took place. Thus a case is registered in order to calm the situation.
He also told me that, sometimes, police officers register a case in favor of one party  or the other 
due to the relations they entertain with them, or with the intention of obtaining some financial 
compensation from the parties.
 The idea that the police had invented the case against  the accused was again suggested 
when the investigative officer was cross-examined. At the end of the cross-examination the 
defense lawyer dictated on his behalf:
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It is incorrect to suggest that in order to meet the provisions of Section 498-a of the Indian Penal 
Code, I manipulated the accused falsely and falsely recorded the statements. It is wrong to suggest 
that in connivance with the witness [the father], I had made a false case against both the accused.
The theory  of a “false case,” which was explicitly denied but implicitly suggested by the text the 
lawyer dictated, was not  completely  shared by the judge. In a conversation I had with him in his 
chambers, he told me that, though he was of the opinion that the father had “manipulated the 
dowry  issue,” he was personally convinced that Anjana had been maltreated by her husband and 
mother-in-law. He also appeared to be touched by what Anjana had written in her diary  and 
interpreted the woman’s act  as the result of incompatibility between her personality  and the in-
laws’ attitude toward her. He also added, however, that though “morally” he was convinced of 
“the veracity of these facts,” he needed to be convinced “from a legal point of view,” and in this 
case, the evidence was not enough to prove the allegations. With the complainant and other 
prosecution witnesses all denying what they had supposedly stated to the police—that Anjana 
had been harassed by her in-laws—and with Anjana making no reference to dowry demands in 
her diary, the prosecutor’s case could not be proved.
 Whether the dowry  issue was raised by the police or by the father, the case shows the 
encompassing effect of the implementation of dowry legislation. As Vindhya pointed out for 
Andhra Pradesh, the primacy given to dowry-related violence hides the other reasons for abuse 
suffered by women (Vindhya 2000). In her research on the reaction of the judiciary  system to 
dowry  deaths, Vindhya notes how, despite legal recognition of the criminal nature of non-dowry 
harassment, the judiciary  perception of the institution of marriage and womanhood reinforces the 
view that violence against women in the home is a matter that belongs to the “private domain of 
the family,” rather than to the state. She also shows how, if it is proved that a woman has 
committed suicide for any other kind of harassment other than dowry-related demands, she will 
be defined by the court as “emotionally over-reactive,” and “prone to suicide at  slight 
provocation”—all kinds of expressions that have also been evoked in Anjana’s case.
 At the end of the trial, the accused (the husband and the mother-in-law) were acquitted. In 
a 15-page ruling, the judge stressed the fact that the main prosecution witnesses were now on the 
side of the accused. This is a short passage from his order (State of Himachal Pradesh vs Neelam 
Safri & Susheel Kumar 2009):
In view of the evidence discussed above, there is no evidence on record based on which it can be 
concluded that any of the accused committed the offences for which they stood charged. Even, 
PW 1 [Prosecution witness number 1], the father of the victim, has turned hostile and [ . . . ] has 
not deposed any fact showing the involvement of the accused in the commission of alleged 
offences. .  .  .  In view of the findings recorded, the prosecution case fails. The accused are acquitted 
of the charges.
Due to the compromise that had already been reached by the parties, to which the father referred 
at the beginning of the trial, there was no way for the judge to prove that  Anjana had been 
abetted to commit suicide due to harassment by her in-laws about her dowry. Consequently, all 
the initial allegations about dowry demands that were reported in the police record did not 
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become effective since all the prosecution witnesses had denied in Court  ever having made such 
allegations. Even though all the prosecutor witnesses were declared “hostile,” the counter story 
they  gave before the judge—that the accused had never mistreated Anjana—became effective in 
determining the judicial outcome. As Kidder (1973:124) noted in his work on civil courts in 
Bangalore, the case shows how “room for manœuvre is provided by relationships and procedures 
operating at several levels simultaneously.”
Conclusion 
 In a volume entitled Authority without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox, Haley  
refers to the German distinction between Authoritat, intended as legitimacy or “entitlement to 
command” and Macht, meant  as the “capacity  to coerce” (1991:13). He notes how, although 
these two concepts are often used synonymously, their distinction is crucial for the political and 
legal context he analyzes. He argues more specifically  that, despite the pervasive presence of the 
State’s authority in Japanese public life, the State’s capacity  to coerce and compel its subjects is 
relatively weak. As a result, Japan relies principally on extralegal informal mechanisms of social 
control as a means of maintaining order in society.
 A similar distinction between authority  and power may also be made in the case at hand. 
We have seen how despite the judge’s authority to conduct the trial and to make a decision, he is 
forced by the rules of evidence and of procedure to give a verdict that is against his personal 
opinion. Informal extra-legal negotiations that  took place between the parties occurred once the 
judiciary  process had already been set in motion, which led the prosecution witnesses to turn 
hostile.
 The problem of witnesses withdrawing their previous statements is particularly relevant 
in an adversary system of justice under which the court “has no independent fact-finding 
apparatus but [. . .] is dependent on the contending parties for the presentation of 
evidence” (Galanter 1989:xxxii). In common-law countries this issue has been the object of a 
very long debate mostly focused on the possibility  of one party disproving or impeaching his 
own witness’s credibility (Bryant 1982). In England until the nineteenth century, for example, the 
idea of cross-examining one’s own witness was forbidden by  some courts, though opinions might 
diverge on the matter.
 In India the practice of cross-examining one’s own witnesses is standard routine due to 
the almost systematic tendency of prosecution witnesses to turn hostile. We have seen how the 
“principle of orality” and the questioning technique enable the witness to contradict what is 
written in the police report. On the other hand, the practice of putting these contradictions in 
writing using various formulae also gives consistency and ensures durability in these 
interactions. These transcripts will in fact be critically  examined by the appeal judge (at  the High 
Court or Supreme Court level) many years after the trial when no witnesses will be heard in 
court. As a matter of fact, a witness’s statement may sometimes not be “effective” at the time of 
the hearing, yet prove to be relevant later on when appeal judges re-examine the case on the basis 
of what has been “put on record.”
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 Appellate Courts in India are far from unanimous about how to deal with the statements 
of prosecution witnesses who have turned hostile, and, in their rulings, they may give opposing 
directives. For example, in a case similar to the one presented here, although a trial judge at a 
Court in Hyderabad convicted the accused despite the prosecution witnesses turning hostile, the 
appeal judge reversed the judgment on the grounds that the judgment did not comply  with the 
principles of burden of proof (Katkuri Ravinder Reddy And Anr. vs State of A.P., Through Its . . . 
on 20 September, 2004 2005 (2) ALD Cri 36):
Be that as it may, in the present case, almost all the witnesses were declared hostile,  but despite the 
same,  the learned Judge recorded findings holding the accused guilty of the offences charged with, 
placing strong reliance on the presumption. This approach adopted by the learned Judge definitely 
is not in conformity with the settled principles of burden of proof in Criminal Jurisprudence. 
Hence,  this Court has no hesitation in holding that the findings recorded by the learned Judge 
suffer from the legal infirmity and are liable to be set aside.  . . . the prosecution miserably failed in 
establishing the guilt of the accused . . .
Judges, in fact, find themselves in a delicate position. On the one hand, they are the court’s 
superior authority, yet, on the other hand, they themselves are the “source of authority,” since 
they  have to interpret the rule of evidence and guarantee that procedures are respected. As the 
example presented here shows, the primacy assigned to procedure rendered effective the 
witness’s spoken words even when they were not considered to be true.
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